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TORTS

I.

WARREN V DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA

Traditionally, official police personnel and their government employers
are not liable to crime victims for failing to provide adequate police protection.' The duty to provide adequate protection has been considered a
public duty, to be redressed by public prosecution, and not by a private
suit for damages.2
Police may be liable in damages, however, if an individual can show
that the police owed him a special duty, separate and distinct from a duty
to the public at large. Courts consider this an individual wrong that may
support a private action for damages.' States and municipalities, as well as
the District of Columbia, have held police liable for failure to provide adequate police protection if a special duty could be shown to an individual.
However, the criteria necessary to establish this duty were left vague. Some
sort of affirmative act by the police, unsolicited by the plaintiff, seemed
necessary, but no continuity in criteria appeared among the courts.4
1. See Rieser v. District of Columbia, 563 F.2d 462 (D.C. Cir. 1977) (rehearingen banc
granted andpanel opinion vacatedon other grounds;panel opinion reinstatedinpertinentpart,
580 F.2d 647 (D.C. Cir. 1978)); Riss v. City of New York, 22 N.Y.2d 579, 240 N.E.2d 860,
293 N.Y.S.2d 897 (1968); Annot., 46 A.L.R.3d 1084 (1972).
2. Warren v. District of Columbia, 444 A.2d I (D.C. 1981) (en banc) (Warren II).
3. Chandler v. District of Columbia, 404 A.2d 964 (D.C. 1979); Trautman v. City of
Stamford, 32 Conn. Supp. 258, 350 A.2d 782 (Conn. Super. Ct. 1975).
4. Police have been held liable in a number of diverse cases. In Schuster v. City of
New York, 5 N.Y.2d 75, 154 N.E.2d 534, 180 N.Y.S.2d 265 (1958), the police solicited information from citizens to track down the notorious gangster, Willie Sutton. When the decedent supplied information to the police which led to Sutton's arrest, his help was widely
publicized. Although the decedent notified police of subsequent death threats, the police
failed to give him adequate protection and he was shot and killed. The New York Court of
Appeals held that the police department had a special duty to protect the decedent and, since
it failed to do so, it was liable for damages. The Court stated that a municipality has a
special duty to use reasonable care to protect citizens who are endangered by participating in
law enforcement, at least where protection is reasonably demanded or sought. Id at 80-81,
154 N.E.2d at 537, 180 N.Y.S.2d at 269.
Similarly, in Gardner v. Village of Chicago Ridge, 71 Ill. App. 2d 373, 219 N.E.2d 147
(1966), the Illinois Appellate Court held that the police had a special duty to protect the
plaintiff when he was beaten by suspects who had been captured with his help. The Illinois
court held that, once the police asked the plaintiff to come to the place of capture, they owed
the plaintiff a duty of protection. Id at 377, 219 N.E.2d at 150.
A special duty was also found to exist in Florence v. Goldberg, 44 N.Y.2d 189, 375 N.E.2d
763, 404 N.Y.S.2d 583 (1978), where a child was injured while crossing an unguarded cross-
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The leading case of this type in the District of Columbia is Reiser v.
District of Columbia,' where the District was sued under the doctrine of
respondent superior for the negligent behavior of a parole officer. In Reiser, the United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit found the District government liable when a parole officer failed to
inform an exconvict's potential employer of the man's violent sexual assault background.6 The exconvict was hired as a maintenance man at the
employer's apartment complex where he later sexually assaulted and murdered a young woman. The court found that the parole officer had a general duty to reveal the man's prior history to a potential employer. The
breach of this duty could give rise to a specific duty to the woman who was
killed because it presented such a grave risk of harm to the female residents of the apartment complex.7
In Warren v. Districtof Columbia,8 the Court of Appeals for the District
of Columbia, sitting en banc, recently reversed an earlier decision which
had clarified the scope of police liability for failure to provide adequate
police protection. In its previous decision, the panel had developed a twoprong test for determining when a special duty is created between the police and a private citizen, effectively applying the tort doctrine of the volunteer to police liability cases:9 first, there must be privity between the
individual and the police which sets the victim apart from the general pubwalk on the way home from school. The police department had previously furnished a
guard at the intersection and had failed to replace her when she became ill or to notify the
school as was required by police regulations. The New York court held that the city could be
liable for negligent failure to replace the guard, notify the school or take any action to safeguard the school children. Id at 193, 375 N.E.2d at 765, 404 N.YS.2d at 585. Its decision
was based upon the voluntary assumption of the guard duty by the police and the subsequent reliance on that guard duty by the parents, forming a special relationship between the
police and the parents of the children. Id at 197, 375 N.E.2d at 767, 404 N.Y.S.2d at 587.
5. 563 F.2d 462 (D.C. Cir. 1977).
6. Id at 479.
7. Id
8. Warren HI, 444 A.2d I (D.C. 1981). Because of the similarity of issues, Warren was
consolidated with Nichol v. District of Columbia on appeal to the District of Columbia
Court of Appeals. In Nichol, a man who was injured in an auto accident relied on the promise of a policeman to obtain vital information about the party responsible for the accident
and was subsequently unable to sue the party when the policeman failed to fulfill his promise. The court originally found that Nichol met the criteria established in Warren, but reversed en banc, holding that Nichol was owed no special duty by the police.
9. This concept is best explained by Judge Cardozo in the classic case of H.R. Moch
Co. v. Rensselaer Water Co., 247 N.Y. 160, 159 N.E. 896 (1928), where he stated:
'It is ancient learning that one who assumes to act, even though gratuitously, may
thereby become subject to the duty of acting carefully, if he acts at all'.... The
hand once set to a task may not always be withdrawn with impunity though liabilIf conduct has gone forward
ity would fail if it had never been applied at all ....
to such a stage that inaction would commonly result, not negatively merely in with-
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lic, making the victim a reasonably foreseeable plaintiff; and second, the
police must give specific assurances of police services that create justifiable
reliance by the victim.' ° The court's en banc decision, however, negated
this test.
In Warren, two men broke into the plaintiffs' house and while they were
raping Miriam Douglas, plaintiffs Warren and Taliaferro called the police,
reported the break-in, and requested assistance. A few minutes later, a police car drove through the alley behind the house. Its occupants did not
follow the standard District of Columbia procedure of stopping the car
and checking the back entrance to the house. One officer did knock on the
front door, but left when he received no answer. Warren's second call to
the police was never dispatched by the police operator. The intruders subsequently discovered Warren and Taliaferro and took them at knifepoint
to their own apartment where they sexually assaulted them for the next
fourteen hours."
The appellants sued the District of Columbia, the policemen who investigated the call, and the dispatchers. Their claims of negligence included
the police officers' failure to investigate properly the call and the failure of
the dispatcher to relay the second call. 2
The trial court granted the appellees' motion to dismiss for failure to
state a claim upon which relief could be granted. The court held that the
police owed no special duty to the women; thus the women had no basis
upon which to sue.' 3
On appeal, the District of Columbia Court of Appeals reversed, holding
that the police owed a special duty to appellants Warren and Taliaferro,
and thus the victims could sue the city for damages caused by the police
department's failure to respond properly to the call. In its decision, the
court developed a two-prong test for determining when the police owe a
special duty to a private citizen. The court found that Warren and Taliaferro's urgent telephone calls to the police removed them from the broad
class of the general public and that any duties which the officers then asholding a benefit, but positively or actively in working an injury, there exists a
relation out of which arises a duty to go forward.
Id at 167, 159 N.E. at 898.
10. See W. PROSSER, HANDBOOK OF THE LAW OF TORTS, § 56 (4th ed. 1971); Warren v.

District of Columbia, No. 79-6, slip op. at 2352 (D.C. Dec. 24, 1980) (Warren I), vacated,
444 A.2d I (D.C. 1981); Sapp v. City of Tallahasee, 348 So. 2d 363 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App.
1977).
11. Warren HI, 444 A.2d at 2. The men were later caught and pleaded guilty to rape
charges. Each received a prison sentence of ten to thirty years.
12. Id
13. Warren 1, No. 79-6, slip op. at 2348.
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sumed were duties to the appellants as individuals, not general duties to
the public. 14 Thus, the victims could be regarded as reasonably foreseeable
plaintiffs. The second prong of the test was satisfied because Warren and
Taliaferro received specific assurances of help from the police that may
have created justifiable reliance on their part.' 5
Upon rehearing, en banc, the court of appeals vacated the panel's decision. It adopted the relevant portions of the trial court's opinion, holding
that the duty to provide adequate police protection is a duty owed to the
general public and that no special relationship existed between the appellants and the police to create a specific legal duty upon which the appellants could sue.' 6 The court held that a request for aid is not by itself
sufficient to create a special duty,' 7 and that the argument that once the
police began to act, they became personally liable for damages, misconstrued both the tort doctrine of the volunteer and the legal status of the
police officer.' 8 The court stated that the concept of the volunteer could
not be applied to a police officer because, unlike the volunteer, he was not
able to assess each emergency situation and determine whether or not to
act, and that "the creation of direct, personal accountability between each
government employee and every member of the community would effectively bring the business of government to a speedy halt ....
'1
Judge Kelly, concurring and dissenting in part, rejected the notion that
the two-prong test would create a direct personal accountability between
public servants and the public that would halt the wheels of government. 20
The two part test earlier set out by the court would not impose strict liability upon police. Both prongs of the test would have to be met and courts
would make such a determination by application of the general tort princi2
ples of foreseeability, proximate cause, and fault. '
In the final analysis, Judge Kelley's view seems more sound. The police,
or any public servant who is negligent should not be allowed to hide behind a cloak of immunity. As the first Warren court aptly stated, "one who
14. Warren I, No. 79-6, slip op. at 2355. See also W. PROSSER, supra note 10, § 56.
15. Warren 1, No. 79-6, slip op. at 2355. The court decided that Ms. Douglas did not
meet these criteria. Even if she were a reasonably foreseeable plaintiff, she did not know that
the police had been called and had promised immediate assistance and, therefore, could not
have reasonably relied upon the police's assurances.
16. Warren HI, 444 A.2d at 3.
17. Id at 6.
18. Id at 7.
19. Id at 8-9.
20. Id at 9.
21. Id at 12 (quoting Rirs, 22 N.Y.2d at 586, 240 N.E.2d at 863, 293 N.Y.S.2d at 902)
(Keating, J., dissenting).
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begins to perform a service to another, whether gratuitously or not, must
perform with reasonable care; thus, he subjects himself to liability for any
harm suffered because the other reasonably and foreseeably relied upon
the actor's performance. '' 22 The courts are able to apply the tort principles
incorporated in the two-prong test to the negligent behavior of police personnel. "No one is contending that the police must be at the scene of every
potential crime. . . .They need only act as a reasonable man would under
the circumstances. '23 Thus, the Warren decision, by rejecting the twoprong test, hinders the development of what seems to be a justifiable standard of accountability.
II. HOLLAND V BALTIMORE & OHIO RAILROAD Co.
Under the common law, a landowner's liability to an entrant who suffered harm from a dangerous condition on his property was determined by
the entrant's status as an invitee, licensee, or trespasser.24 The landowner,
under the traditional rule, was least liable to a trespasser, defined as one
who enters on land without the owner's consent.25 This liability was limited to injuries sustained by the trespasser due to the owner's wilful or
wanton conduct. 26 The landowner owed a greater responsibility to a licensee, defined as one privileged to enter the land because he had the owner's
consent.27 Although under no obligation to make the property safe for the
licensee, the landowner was liable for injuries to the licensee from dangerous conditions on the property that were not reasonably discoverable.28
The landowner was most liable to an invitee, owing the duty to exercise
reasonable care for his safety because the invitee's presence on the property was not only desired but often induced for economic purposes.2 9
The modem approach, followed by many jurisdictions, is to abolish
these class distinctions altogether, measuring landowner's liability according to a "reasonable care under the circumstances" standard.3" Other juris22. Warren I, No. 79-6, slip op. at 2353. See also W. PROSSER, supra note 10, § 56; 2 F.
HARPER &

F.

JAMES, THE LAW OF TORTS §

18.16 (1956); 2

RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF

TORTS § 323 (1965).

23. Riss, 22 N.Y.2d at 586, 240 N.E.2d at 863, 293 N.Y.S.2d at 902 (Keating, J.,
dissenting).
24. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS §§ 329-332 (1965), 62 AM. JUR. 2D Premises
Liability § 96 (1972).
25. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 329 (1965).

26. See 62 AM. JUR. 2D Premises Liability §§ 89, 90 (1972).
27.
28.
29.
30.

RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 330 (1965).
Id § 341.
See 62 AM. JUR. 2D Premises Liability §§ 37, 65 (1972).
Annot., 32 A.L.R.3d 508 (1970).
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dictions have abolished only the distinction between invitees and licensees,
maintaining the traditional rule for trespassers. In Holland v. Baltimore &
Ohio Railroad Co. ,3"the District of Columbia Court of Appeals has now
made clear, despite previous contrary indications, that the District will follow the latter approach.
In Holland, a nine year old child sued the railroad after he fell under a
train while trespassing on defendant's land. Plaintiff claimed that the railroad was an attractive nuisance. The trial court, however, dismissed plaintiff's complaint for failure to state a claim upon which relief could be
granted. First, plaintiffs attractive nuisance theory failed because "the
doctrine of attractive nuisance 'does not extend to things which become
dangerous only when adults set them in motion,' such as a moving railroad
car .. . ." Second, the court cited Firfer v. United States,3 3 to deny
plaintiff any alternative relief. In Firfer, the United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit had established that a landowner
in the District of Columbia need only refrain from inflicting wilful, wanton, or intentional injury on a trespasser. Thus, because the plaintiff in
Holland was a trespasser and because, as a matter of law, the railroad had
not inflicted wilful, wanton, or intentional injury upon him, the court held
that his complaint had failed to state a claim and dismissed it.
After a panel initially affirmed, the District of Columbia Court of Appeals agreed to rehear plaintiffs case en banc "to decide whether the Fir/er
rule should be abandoned, and if it is not, whether the attractive nuisance
exception is available to [plaintiff]. ' 34 In a split decision, the court concluded that Fir/er "continues to represent the general rule of landowner
liability in this jurisdiction," 35 and refused to abandon this standard in
favor of a "reasonable care under the circumstances" standard as was
adopted by the United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit in Smith v. Arbaugh's Restaurant,Inc.36
Although the court noted some movement toward abolishing the distinctions between invitee and licensee for the purposes of the landowner's duty
of care, the majority of jurisdictions, including the District of Columbia,
have not changed the landowner's duty of care to trespassers.37 The court
31.

431 A.2d 597 (D.C. 1981).

32. Id at 598, citing Harris v. Roberson, 139 F.2d 529 (D.C. Cir. 1943).
33. 208 F.2d 524 (D.C. Cir. 1953).
34. Holland,431 A.2d at 599.
35. Id
36. 469 F.2d 97 (D.C. Cir. 1972), cert. denied, 412 U.S. 939 (1973).
37. 431 A.2d at 599. The court cited Alston v. Baltimore & O.R.R. Co., 433 F. Supp. 553
(D.D.C. 1977) & W. PROSSER, supra note 10, § 62, at 398.
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stated that its decisions in Blumenthal v. Cairo Hotel Corp.,38 and D. C.
Transit System, Inc. v. Carney,39 had abolished any distinction in the standard of care owed by a landowner to invitees or licensees and had instead
established a duty of reasonable care under all circumstances."a In Holland, however, the court refused to abolish the distinction as to trespassers,
of reasonable care suggested in Smith v.
and rejected the single standard
1
Arbaugh 's Restaurant, Inc. 4
In Arbaugh's Restaurant, a health inspector sought recovery for a back
injury he incurred when he slipped on a restaurant stairway while making
an inspection. Although it denied plaintiff recovery, the District of Columbia Circuit discarded the common law distinctions for determining a landowner's duty of care. The circuit court concluded "[a] landowner must act
as a reasonable man in maintaining his property in a reasonably safe condition in view of all the circumstances ....",42
The Court of Appeals in Holland, however, refused to adopt this standard. Because Arbaugh's Restaurant had been handed down at a time
when the circuit court was no longer the expositor of District of Columbia
law, the decision had no precedential value. And, because the court could
"find no other compelling reason to abandon Firfer," it ruled that this decision should remain the law of the District with regard to trespassers on
land.4 3
In Washington Metropolitan Area Transit Authority v Ward," the District of Columbia Court of Appeals reversed an award of damages for injuries sustained when the plaintiff slipped on an oil-absorbing compound
while delivering a set of work-clothes to her employee son. The court remanded for a determination of whether she was a trespasser and thus was
owed no reasonable standard of care.4 5
Although Judge Ferren concurred in the Ward result, because the trial
38.
39.
40.
41.
42.

256 A.2d 400 (D.C. 1969).
254 A.2d 402 (D.C. 1969).
Holland, 431 A.2d at 599.
469 F.2d 97 (D.C. Cir. 1972), cert. denied, 412 U.S. 939 (1973).
Id at 100.

43. Holland,431 A.2d at 600. Specifically, the court noted that as applied to trespassers,
the single standard of care imposed in Arbaugh's Restaurant was dicta as the landowner's
duty toward a trespasser was not before the court. Further, the Arbaugh's Restaurant deci-

sion was handed down after February 1, 1971, the effective date of court reorganization,
thus, the District of Columbia Circuit decision lacked binding precedential effect on District
of Columbia courts. Finally, the court concluded that Erie Railroad v. Tompkins, 304 U.S.
64 (1938), required the District of Columbia Court of Appeals to adhere to the Firfer standard since it was substantive legal precedent from the highest court of the jurisdiction.'
44. 433 A.2d 1072 (D.C. 1981).

45. Id at 1073.
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court had incorrectly relied on Arbaugh'sRestaurant as controlling law, he
nevertheless urged "a single standard of reasonable care under the circumstances," irrespective of the status of the entrant upon the land (trespasser,
licensee, invitee).4 6 According to Judge Ferren, Blumenthal v. Cairo Hotel
Corp. ,47 which established a duty of reasonable care as to invitees and
licensees, should be extended to all entrants. The foreseeability of the entrant's presence should bear on the question whether the landowner acted
with "reasonable care." 48 Judge Ferren noted that
status distinctions clutter the analysis. . . .The question whether
[plaintiff] was an invitee, licensee, or trespasser is a most difficult,
even impressionistic one. A digression into that thicket gets in the
way of the only straightforward-and proper--question for the
jury: Did [the landowner] exercise reasonable care to protect
[plaintiff] from injury, given all the circumstances including the
extent to 49
which [the landowner] indulged her presence on the
premises?
The Holland decision thus clarified the District of Columbia Court of
Appeals' position on the duty of care owed to trespassers by landowners.
The closeness of this decision, however, indicates that this clarification
may last only temporarily. Judge Ferren's dissent in Holland and concurring opinion in Ward demonstrate the appeal of the single standard of care
as applied by the District of Columbia Circuit in Arbaugh's Restaurant.
The equitable flexibility of this latter standard, may soon lead the court to
reexamine the issue and impose a single standard of care on landowners in
the District of Columbia.50
Martha Brooks van der Veen, DanielHam

46. Id at 1074. Judge Ferren cited the following as authority for his position: Smith v.
Arbaugh's Restaurant, Inc., 469 F.2d 97, 107 (D.C. Cir. 972), cer. denied, 412 U.S. 939
(1973); Rowland v. Christian, 69 Cal. 2d 108, 117, 443 P.2d 561, 568, 70 Cal. Rptr. 97, 104
(1968) (en bane); Mile High Fence Co. v. Radovich, 175 Colo. 537, 548, 489 P.2d 308, 314
(1971) (en bane); Pickard v. City & County of Honolulu, 51 Haw. 134-35, 452 P.2d 445-46
(1969); Ouelette v. Blanchard, 116 N.H. 552, 557, 364 A.2d 631, 634 (1976); Basso v. Miller,
40 N.Y.2d 233, 241, 386 N.Y.S.2d 564, 568, 852 N.E.2d 868, 872 (1976); Mariorenzi v. Joseph DiPonte, Inc., 114 R.I. 294, 307, 333 A.2d 127, 133 (1975). See generally Comment, The
Common Law Tort Liability of Owners and Occupiersof Land 4 Trapfor th'e
Unwary?, 36
MD. L. REV. 816 (1977).
47. 256 A.2d 400 (D.C. 1969).
48. Ward, 433 A.2d at 1074.
49. Id at 1075.
50. For further analysis of Holland,see Note, Holland Y.Baltimore & Ohio R. Defining the Duty Owed to Trespassersin the Districtof Columbia, 31 CATH. U.L. REV. 591 (1982).

